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HEALTH LAW
I. COURT ALLOWS DISCOVERY FROM VOLUNTEER BLOOD DONORS
IN TRANSFUSION-RELATED AIDS LITIGATION
In Watson v. Lowcountry Red Cross' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed a district court order granting plaintiff's motion to compel certain
discovery from a volunteer blood donor.' The court held that allowing direct
discovery from an anonymous blood donor did not violate either Rule 26(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure3 or the United States and South
Carolina Constitutions.4 The court concluded that the discovery did not
violate the donor's constitutional right to privacy,5 that no significant evidence
demonstrated that allowing the discovery would lead to a dangerous depletion
of the blood supply, 6 and that the discovery sought by the plaintiff was
"'reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 7
The Watson decision appears to contradict Doe v. American Red Cross
Blood Services,' in which the South Carolina Federal District Court denied
a plaintiff's similar discovery request, holding that disclosure of the requested
* information would destroy confidentiality and adversely affect the nation's
blood supply.' However, the cases may not be inconsistent because the two
courts used similar reasoning in deciding whether to allow the discovery, but
reached opposite conclusions based on factual differences. The following
factors appeared determinative in each case: (1) the degree of intrusiveness of
the requested discovery method, and (2) the plaintiffs need for the informa-
tion, considering other available discovery and its sufficiency. The plaintiff
in Doe requested that the donor's identity be revealed or that a "veiled
deposition" take place,"0 whereas Watson sought and was granted discovery
in the form of limited interrogatories with the donor's name remaining
undisclosed." Further, the Doe court questioned the need for the requested
discovery because of the availability of other sufficient discovery; 2 whereas
1. 974 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1992).
2. Id. at 489.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
4. Watson, 974 F.2d at 487-88.
5. Id. at 488.
6. Id. at 485-87.
7. Id. at 489 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)).
8. 125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989).
9. Id. at 657.
10. Id. at 649.
11. Watson, 974 F.2d at 484 (the donor's identity would be divulged only to the court and to
the lawyer representing the donor).
12. See Doe, 125 F.R.D. at 654.
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the Watson court deemed the discovery necessary, if not crucial, to Watson's
case. 13
The Doe decision does not represent a policy of denial in all cases,
however.' 4 The Watson and Doe decisions are consistent with. the majority
of courts that have addressed the volunteer blood donor. discovery issue.
These decisions represent a compromise between the donor's interest in
privacy and the nation's interest in a safe and adequate blood supply on one
side, and the plaintiff's interest in pursuing litigation and the preservation of
the adversarial system on the other side."
The plaintiff, Cynthia Watson, brought this wrongful death action against
Lowcountry Red Cross ("Red Cross") and the Medical University of South
Carolina 6 following the death of her infant twin son, Trevor. A premature
infant, Trevor remained hospitalized for approximately two months following
his birth, during which time he received numerous blood transfusions. Trevor
tested positive for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in 1986, and died
of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in 1988.17
In pursuing a negligent screening theory of liability against the Red Cross,
Watson claimed that the already-completed discovery was inadequate and
sought information from the "implicated donor" 8 regarding the donor's
background and the donation process. 9 When the Red Cross objected to the
donor discovery, the matter was referred to a magistrate who "dismissed as
13. See Watson, 974 F.2d at 488.
14. See Doe, 125 F.R.D. at 657 ("Unfortunately, there are cases in which society's interest
must take precedence over the interests that a few individuals may have in pursuing pretrial
discovery in order to prosecute their claims for compensatory damages. This is such a case.")
15. See id. at 649 (deciding to grant a protective order for the donor's protection after
balancing the competing interests involved); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court,
763 P.2d 1003, 1010 (Colo. 1988) (en bane) (balancing of interests used to determine whether
to disclose donor's identity); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535
(Fla. 1987) (balanced competing interests in deciding whether to grant or deny discovery). For
a more expansive list of cases, see Lincoln A. Terzian, Note, AIDS-Confidentiality-Individuals
Infected with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Through Blood Transfusions May
Obtain Limited Disclosure of Donor's Identity During Pretrial Discovery-Snyder v. Mekhjian,
125 N.J. 328, 593 A.2d 318 (1991), 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 999, 1006-07 n.39 (1992).
16. The Medical University of South Carolina was not a party to this appeal.
17. Watson, 974 F.2d at 483.
18. Pursuant to ordinary procedures, the Red Cross conducted a look-back investigation and
found that only one of the six donors whose blood was used in Trevor's transfusions might have
been HIV-positive at the time of the donation. See id. at 484.
19. Id. Neither of the two nurses deposed could recall any information about the particular
donor or the donation process. Further, other nonidentifying information, including a
questionnaire, pamphlet, and health history card, failed to provide the needed information. Id.
But see Doe, 125 F.R.D. at 648 (concluding that the necessary information was provided when
nurses recalled a discussion with the donor to determine his eligibility and statements by the
donor that he had a positive Australian antibody test).
1993]
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factually unfounded the Red Cross's claims that the invasion of the donor's
privacy would seriously jeopardize the nation's blood supply."2" The district
court accepted the magistrate's recommendation that the court allow discovery
in the form of limited interrogatories, leaving the donor unidentified.2 The
Red Cross appealed.
In affirming the district court's order permitting limited donor discovery,
the Fourth Circuit addressed three main questions in light of the particular
discovery scheme set forth in the protective order: (1) whether Watson's
interest in the discovery outweighed the nation's interest in an adequate and
safe blood supply; (2) whether Watson's interest in the discovery outweighed
the donor's right to privacy; and (3) whether the discovery would be relevant
and authorized by Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
First, the court dispensed with the Red Cross's argument that the fear of
possible disclosure of donor identity and possible involvement in tort actions
would deter volunteers from donating blood, thus reducing the blood supply.
Although the Red Cross cited cases supporting its view,' "[no] mention of
any statistical or empirical underpinning for the stated concerns about the
effect on the blood supply" existed to substantiate the merits of this claim.24
The court also rejected the Red Cross's second argument that disclosure
of the donor's identity violated the donor's constitutional privacy rights.'
The court held that "the invasion of the donor's privacy is minimal, and this
interest is greatly outweighed by the plaintiffs need for the information and
the related public interest in seeing that injuries are compensated."26 The
safeguards and precautions mandated in the protective order rendered the risk
of public disclosure remote.27 The court also rejected the Red Cross's
allegation that the interrogatories would "harass and embarrass" the donor on
two grounds. First, the donor consented to similar interrogation at the
20. Watson, 974 F.2d at 484.
21. For a reproduction of the protective order, see id. at 489-92. The protective order
provides for maintenance of the donor's confidentiality, requires appointment of an attorney for
the donor, and lists eighteen questions for the donor to answer concerning prior donations, the
particular donation in question, and limited aspects of the donor's personal history. See id.
22. Id. at 488.
23. See Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Mich. 1990), aftd, 979
F.2d 1135 (6th Cir. 1992); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla.
1987). In both cases, the danger to the blood supply outweighed the plaintiffs discovery needs.
24. Watson, 974 F.2d at 486.
25. Id. at 488.
26. Id.
27. The protective order required disclosure of the donor's identity only to court and the
donor's lawyer. Id. at 489-92; cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-602 (1977) (upholding a
New York statute which required physicians to disclose the identity of patients receiving certain
prescription drugs to the state health department).
[Vol. 45
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donation site.2" Second, absent public disclosure, any embarrassment or
harassment suffered by the donor does not implicate constitutional concerns.29
Therefore, the court concluded that because no public disclosure would result,
no privacy violation would occur.3"
Finally, the court reviewed the relevancy of the evidence under Rule 26(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and found no abuse of discretion by
the district court.3 The court observed that denying donor discovery would
in effect grant blood donor centers "blanket immunity from donation-related
liability. "32 Furthermore, the plaintiffs case depended on discovery of the
donor's identity.33
While no consensus exists regarding the importance of the various
conflicting interests that arise in transfusion-related AIDS cases, 34 most courts
agree that a balancing-of-interests approach, coupled with close attention to the
facts of each case, is the proper method.35
Blood centers frequently argue that possible disclosure will deter donors
from giving blood, which will result in depletion of the blood supply.36 The
blood centers further argue that possible disclosure will jeopardize the quality
of the blood supply because it renders blood donors unwilling to provide
accurate health histories. 37  While the Watson court glossed over these
arguments as unfounded for lack of statistical data, 3 many courts have given
significant weight to or premised their holdings on this issue.39
Addressing the adequacy and safety of the nation's blood supply, the Doe
court asserted that compromising donor confidentiality would threaten not only
28. Watson, 974 F.2d at 488.
29. Id.; see also Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602 (finding disclosure of private medical information
distinguishable from mere unpleasant privacy invasions incidental to health care).
30. Watson, 974 F.2d at 488.
31. Id. at 489.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 484 (noting the lack of consensus among the numerous courts and law reviews
addressing the issue).
35. See supra note 15 for cases applying the balancing test; see also Terzian, supra note 15,
at 1006-07 n.39.
36. Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 652-53 (D.S.C. 1989).
37. Id. at 653.
38. See supra text accompanying note 24.
39. Doe, 125 F.R.D. at 653; see also Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 362
(E.D. Mich. 1990) (admitting donor discovery could severely impair the volunteerblood supply),
aff'd, 979 F.2d 1135 (6th Cir. 1992); Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (Sup.
Ct. 1987) (society's interest in maintaining the blood supply outweighed the plaintiff's need for
donor discovery); Taylor v. West Penn Hosp., 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178, 186 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
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the quantity of the blood supply, but also the safety of the blood supply.4"
Volunteer donors are preferred over paid donors because volunteer donors are
less likely to be infected than paid donors, and volunteer donors are more
likely to provide truthful information during the screening process than paid
donors."1 The Doe court acknowledged the federal government's encourage-
ment of an all-volunteer blood supply system. 2 The longstanding practice
of maintaining and protecting the blood supply system, along with statutes
enacted to protect donor confidentiality, evidenced this intent.43
Of the courts giving significant weight to the argument concerning the
nation's interest in the blood supply, the safety/quality issue persuaded courts
more than the donor deterrence/quantity issue." Safety and quantity do not
always go hand-in-hand, and safety is the primary goal. In Borzillieri v.
American National Red Cross,'4 a New York district court stated that, while
"[d]efendants stress[ed] the need for a plentiful blood supply, . . . it is
equally, if not more important to ensure that the blood that is donated is
healthy. "46 While the interest in maintaining an adequate quantity of blood
is great, a blood supply cannot be adequate if it is not safe. Therefore, it is
beneficial to deter donors from giving blood if they might be contaminated.
4 7
Moreover, aside from any suggested deterrence based on fear of disclosure,
screening measures used to detect AIDS over the last few years have
significantly reduced the donor base.48 With improved AIDS testing
methods, the donors deterred by possible disclosure will likely already be
labeled "at risk" and excluded from the donor base without regard to the fear
of identity disclosure.49
40. Doe, 125 F.R.D. at 653.
41. Id. at 652-53. The court's main concern lies with the volunteer blood supply because paid
donors are distinguished and are not entitled to this degree of special protection.
42. Id. at 652 (citing National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,701 (1974)).
43. Id. at 652-53.
44. See Amy L. Fisher, Note, AIDS: The Life and Death Conflict Between the Confidentiality
of Blood Donors and the Recovery of Blood Recipients, 42 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
283, 303-05 (1992) (deterring donations from those in high-risk groups furthers the safety of the
blood supply); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1012 (Colo.
1988) (en bane) (noting society's interest in maintaining a safe blood supply).
45. 139 F.R.D. 284 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
46. Id. at 291 (citing Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 126 (W.D. La. 1989) and
Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr., 763 P.2d at 1011).
47. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
48. Fisher, supra note 44, at 302-04.
49. See Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 362 (E.D. Mich. 1990)
(recognizing reduction of the donor pool due to AIDS testing), aff'd, 979 F.2d 1135 (6th Cir.
1992); Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 377 (Wash. 1991) (en bane) (recognizing
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In summary, the Watson court correctly stated that no statistical data
evidenced a significant negative impact on the safety or adequacy of the blood
supply, although it failed to adequately consider meritorious concerns and
dispensed with the issue in a cursory manneri 0 The Doe court's emphasis
on the blood supply considerations cannot be reconciled with Watson, but may
be explained by the different facts and circumstances of each case and the
desire for different outcomes.51
With the onset of the AIDS epidemic, most jurisdictions, including South
Carolina, enacted statutes to protect the confidentiality of persons testing HIV-
positive. These statutes provide procedures for disclosure of AIDS case
records upon written consent, impose penalties for improper disclosure of
medical records, and set forth guidelines for AIDS educational programs.
5 2
The statutes primarily seek to encourage AIDS testing and to protect
confidentiality of patients. The protective statutes provide, additional argument
for blood centers seeking to protect complete donor confidentiality. For
example, in Irwin Memorial Blood Bank v. Superior Court,3 a California
court held that even limited interrogatories from an anonymous blood donor
constituted "identification" within the meaning of the AIDS protection statute,
and therefore denied the requested discovery. 54 While the Watson court did
not consider section 44-29-905s or legislative concerns, 6 the Doe court
relied on this statute as evidence of legislative intent to provide for and protect
an all-volunteer blood donation system. 7 Courts in other jurisdictions have
acknowledged the effect of AIDS protection statutes in limiting or denying
50. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text; see also Snyder v. Mekhjian, 593 A.2d
318, 324 (N.J. 1991) (per curiam) (Pollock, J., concurring) (no study or statistics show that
confidentiality encourages people to donate blood).
51. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13.
52. South Carolina's AIDS statute provides in pertinent part:
To the extent resources are available to the Department of Health and Environmental
Control for this purpose, when a person is identified as being infected with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the virus which causes Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS), his known sexual contacts or intravenous drug use contacts, or
both, must be notified but the identity of the person infected must not be revealed.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-90 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. ch.
381.004(3)(f) (Harrison 1993) (containing a similar provision).
53. 279 Cal. Rptr. 911 (Ct. App. 1991).
54. Id. at 913.
55. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-90 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
56. The court may have deemed these issues irrelevant after finding that no disclosure of or
intrusion into confidentiality would occur.
57. Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 651 (D.S.C. 1989)
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donor discovery because the statutes tend to balance the scale in favor of
privacy.
58
While the United States Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a right
to privacy, the Supreme Court found that privacy rights exist in two areas: (1)
decision-making'regarding fundamentally important areas, and (2) the right to
freedom from government disclosure of personal information. 9 Further, the
South Carolina Constitution articulates an express right to privacy that the
United States Constitution does not.' AIDS transfusion-related litigation
emphasizes a person's privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters protected by these constitutions, either explicitly or implicitly. In
Watson the court of appeals refused to hold that the donor's privacy rights
would be violated because anonymous discovery from an anonymous donor
was simply outside the scope of privacy. The nature of the discovery was
limited, and the identity of the donor would not be revealed. 61  In the
alternative, even if the donor's privacy rights were implicated, the plaintiff's
interest in pursuing the litigation outweighed any privacy interest.6' In
contrast, Doe utilized the privacy right to deny donor discovery.63 Rasmus-
sen v. South Florida Blood Services, Inc.' outlined the privacy issue in detail
in deciding that the donor's privacy outweighed the plaintiff's interest in
discovery.' In Rasmussen, the plaintiff, who received fifty-one units of
blood after an automobile accident and was later diagnosed with AIDS, sought
to obtain all records containing the names and addresses of the fifty-one blood
donors.6  The court denied the plaintiffs request, reasoning that this
58. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987);
see also Richard C. Turkington, ConfidentialityPolicyforHIV-Relatedlnformation:AnAnalytical
Framework for Sorting Out Hard and Easy Cases, 34 VILL. L. REv. 871, 899-902 (1989).
59. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). Whalen involved the constitutionality of
a New York statute requiring physicians to identify patients with prescriptions for certain classes
of drugs. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that the statute "threatens to impair both
[the patients'] interest in the nondisclosure of private information and also their interest in making
important decisions independently," the Court found no constitutional violation. Id. at 600.
60. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against ... unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated
.... " This section also addresses unreasonable searches and seizures, while the comparable
portion of the United States Constitution, the Fourth Amendment, does not contain any express
language regarding privacy rights. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
61. Watson v. Lowcountry Red Cross, 974 F.2d 482, 487 (4th Cir. 1992).
62. Id.
63. Doe v. Am. Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 657 (D.S.C. 1989).
64. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987)
65. Id. at 538.
66. S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985),
aft'd, 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
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discovery would violate the donors' privacy rights under the United States and
Florida constitutions.67
However, in Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Center v. District Court" the
Colorado Supreme Court addressed the privacy issue, and although acknowl-
edging that the donor had a right to privacy, it permitted the plaintiffs
discovery.69 Belle Bonfils and Watson are distinguishable from Rasmussen
because the court orders in both cases required that confidentiality be
maintained,70 and also because the discovery was necessary to litigate the
claims. 7' In cases such as Belle Bonfils and Watson, in which donor identity
remains undisclosed, plaintiffs have a strong argument that no privacy interest
is involved, or at least that any privacy invasion is minimal. The court must
weigh the degree of invasion of privacy that would occur under the proposed
discovery plan against the plaintiff's interest in obtaining the discovery. This
weighing is consistent with the balancing test applied in most AIDS transfu-
sion-related litigation.72 If some alternative means that do not require donor
privacy invasion can provide the plaintiff with sufficient information, then the
court should employ the alternative means. While the shockingly invasive
discovery requested (names of 51 donors) in Rasmussen may have determined
the court's decision, Watson and Belle Bonfils involved less invasive discovery
techniques.
In conclusion, the Watson court followed the balancing-of-interests
approach, and through the protective order safeguarding the donor's identity,
achieved a compromise solution. The limited donor discovery could benefit
the plaintiff, one hopes without invading the donors privacy to a substantial
degree. The Watson court may have been a bit too optimistic in stating that
the limited, anonymous discovery granted to the plaintiff would have virtually
no harsh effects on the donor or the blood supply. All solutions present a
down-side to some extent. One hopes, because current HIV testing is over
ninety-nine percent accurate, the number of AIDS transfusion-related cases
will soon decrease substantially.73
Angela D. Rowe
67. Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 535-36.
68. 763 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1988) (en bane).
69. Id. at 1013.
70. Watson v. Lowcountry Red Cross, 974 F.2d 482, 487-88 (4th Cir. 1992); Belle Bonfils
Memorial Blood Ctr., 763 P.2d at 1013-14.
71. Watson, 974 F.2d at 489; Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr., 763 P.2d at 1013.
72. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
73. See Terzian, supra note 15, at 1032-34.
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